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Abstract
This paper reports on a comparative study of temporary 
protection (TP) mechanisms in Australia and selected 
European jurisdictions . Specifically, it analyzes policy 
developments and trends in the use of TP mechanisms in 
Denmark, Germany, and Australia through a systematic 
examination of the evolution of “substitute protection” 
mechanisms; their implications for “effective protection” 
and their impacts on key stakeholders . The policy analyses 
are augmented by interviews and survey questionnaires 
with key NGO service providers in the three target jurisdic-
tions . The paper argues that the traditional link between 
Refugee Convention protection and national territorial 
jurisdiction and responsibility is being undermined by 
extraterritorial processing and offshoring arrangements .
Résumé
Cet article rapporte une étude comparative des mécanismes 
de la protection temporaire des réfugiés en Australie et 
dans certains pays européens . Plus précisément, on y ana-
lyse l’évolution des politiques et les tendances du recours 
à la protection temporaire au Danemark, en Allemagne 
et en Australie par le biais d’un examen systématique 
de l’évolution des mécanismes de la « protection de rem-
placement », de leurs conséquences pour la « protection 
effective » et de leurs impacts sur les principales parties 
prenantes . L’analyse des politiques est complétée par des 
questionnaires d’enquête et des entretiens avec les princi-
paux prestataires de services non gouvernementaux dans 
les trois pays à l’étude . On propose que le lien tradition-
nel entre la protection accordée par la Convention sur les 
réfugiés, la responsabilité et la compétence territoriale est 
mis à mal par le traitement extraterritorial des réfugiés et 
les modalités de leur délocalisation .
Introduction
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
henceforth Refugee Convention, and other associated 
standards may be seen as critical elements of liberal inter-
nationalist aspirations for universal human rights protec-
tion in the post–World War II era. These standards are 
based on the principle that justice as a dimension of citizen-
ship rights needs to be extended to a global sphere rather 
than remain confined within the boundaries of a nation-
state. Globalization is seen to have shifted the role of the 
state, creating challenges to its power from global markets, 
intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs;1 undermin-
ing macroeconomic management (thus increasing public 
insecurity); and reasserting of the politics of the border.2 
The attempt by Australia and other western governments to 
deter, detain, and deport those entering “through the back 
door”3 is seen by some as a move away from a rights-based 
liberal internationalism towards exclusionary nationalism 
or a “particularist internationalism”4 which redefines asy-
lum as a political benefit bestowed by the host state, rather 
than a human right invoked and accessed by individuals 
irrespective of their mode of entry.5
The increasing restrictiveness of asylum policies in west-
ern countries is part of a broader trend that has existed 
throughout the history of western humanitarianism where 
interventions have been made on a “selective,” primarily 
self-interest basis.6 The relatively unified nature of restrict-
ive asylum policies is seen to arise from the sharp increase 
in asylum claims since the 1980s in western countries,7 the 
loss of ideological prestige that granting asylum gave to host 
societies after the end of the Cold War,8 and the decline in 
resettlement opportunities that occurred in the aftermath 
of the international economic recession and the changed 
labour requirements of globalization.9 It is within this his-
torical framework that more restrictive asylum policies such 
as temporary protection (TP) have recently been adopted in 
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many western countries including Australia that alter the 
definition and application of “effective protection”10 as ori-
ginally conceived in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Indeed, one of the most striking features of the inter-
national refugee regime over the last twenty-five years is the 
development of alternative forms of protection to the 1951 
UN Convention on Refugees.11 Australia, Denmark, and 
Germany are three countries that in recent years introduced 
temporary protection regimes for Convention refugees as 
a keystone asylum policy. This article assesses the impact 
of TP in each of the three countries. It analyzes policy 
developments and trends, and then examines how these 
policies affect two main stakeholders: refugees, and non-
governmental organizations that provide support services 
to refugees.
Background: Temporary Protection and the 
Refugee Convention
Between 1999 and 2005, Australia, Germany, and Denmark 
introduced policies mandating initial periods of tempor-
ary protection for Convention refugees. In 1999 Australia 
 instituted a policy of providing three-year temporary pro-
tection visas (TPVs) to all asylum seekers arriving without a 
valid visa and later found to be Convention refugees. From 
2002 in Denmark, and 2005 in Germany, all refugees have 
been subject to an initial period of temporary protection: 
for seven years in Denmark and three years in Germany. 
Following the election of a centre-left government in 
November 2007, Australia abolished the temporary protec-
tion visa regime in May 2008.
While the three countries discussed in this paper are 
all signatories to the Refugee Convention, each sits within 
a distinct context of regional and international refugee 
law. Australia draws on the Refugee Convention and other 
international treaties such as the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as the context for the 
development of its domestic refugee policy. Germany’s refu-
gee policy is developed with reference to both the Refugee 
Convention and the still-evolving EU-orchestrated Common 
European Asylum System. The Common European Asylum 
System includes the Schengen Agreement, the Amsterdam 
Treaty, and the Dublin Regulation, each of which, although 
careful not to breach the Refugee Convention, restricts the 
ability for asylum seekers to move within Europe. Seeking 
more control over asylum seekers entering its country, 
Denmark has opted out of the Common European Asylum 
System, though it remains a party to the Dublin Regulation 
and Schengen Agreement.
Historically, the concept of temporary protection has 
been seen as valid in cases of mass refugee movements, 
when individual status determinations are impractical in 
the short term and temporary group-based protection is 
appropriate. In western jurisdictions, prior to 1999, tem-
porary protection was typically employed to meet interim 
protection needs in situations of “refugee catastrophes,”12 or 
for complementary protection purposes, where an individ-
ual application for refugee status has been rejected but the 
person is found to be at risk of human rights abuse.13 By 
contrast, this paper focuses on “substitute protection”:14 the 
recent application of TP to individually assessed Convention 
refugees in some western jurisdictions as a restrictive mech-
anism to reduce refugee rights and prevent integration. 
While “substitute” protection for Convention refugees does 
not breach a signatory state’s non-refoulement obligations—
provided precautions are taken ensuring that the refugees 
will be returned to a safe environment when the period 
of temporary protection ceases—these newer TP regimes 
commonly confer fewer rights on Convention refugees.15 
For Fitzpatrick, where TP is offered as a “diluted substitute 
protection for Convention refugees,”16 it should be seen as a 
threat to the 1951 refugee regime.
Methodology
This paper reports on a systematic comparative examination 
of the evolution of the temporary protection mechanisms in 
Australia, Germany, and Denmark. It evaluates the implica-
tions of these policies for the 1951 Refugee Convention, and 
also the impact of various EU agreements on the European 
countries. The policy analysis is augmented by semi-struc-
tured interviews and surveys of key non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and service providers in Australia, 
Denmark, and Germany. The interviews were conducted 
and directed towards finding out the impact of temporary 
protection on refugees, on the services refugees required, 
and on the ability of NGOs to meet this need. Particular 
attention was paid towards the impact of the policy on pro-
tection status and permanency; access to settlement services 
and programs; education, health, and work rights; and ces-
sation, repatriation, and integration mechanisms at the end 
of the temporary protection. The policy developments are 
examined in the context of corresponding political tensions 
between the uses of temporary protection to meet the aims 
of both liberal-humanitarian and restrictive policy impulses. 
The latter refers to the tension between border protection 
harmonization initiatives on one hand, and the mainten-
ance of more restrictive national regimes articulated with 
an increasing “securitization” agenda on the other.
The Three Case Studies
Australia
Australia’s humanitarian program resettles approxi-
mately 13,000 refugees each year. This quota comprises 
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two categories. The “refugee category” resettles 6,000 “off-
shore” refugees from UNHCR camps in areas assessed to 
be of greatest need. A further 7,000 resettlement places are 
set aside for the Special Humanitarian Program (SHP) (also 
“offshore”) and for “onshore” arrivals. Offshore refugees 
are granted the full range of settlement services and enjoy 
the same range of rights as Australian nationals. Since the 
1970s, the arrival of so-called “onshore” refugees, particu-
larly “unauthorized” arrivals who arrive by boat without a 
visa of any kind, has caused a problem for successive govern-
ments. Onshore refugees are those who invoke their right 
to seek asylum once they have entered the migration zone. 
Although under international law this group is the only 
group that Australia is legally obliged to offer protection to, 
the unregulated nature of their arrival has been regarded as 
a problem by successive governments. Australia’s tempor-
ary protection policy, introduced in October 1999, aimed 
to control and limit the arrival of onshore asylum seekers 
popularly referred to as “unauthorized” boat arrivals.
From October that year, all asylum seekers who entered 
Australia’s migration zone without a valid visa of any kind, 
but who were found to satisfy Convention criteria, were 
initially granted temporary protection, before being able to 
apply for a permanent visa after three years. In September 
2001 the policy was strengthened by the “seven-day rule,” 
which declared asylum seekers who had spent longer than 
seven days in a country “where they could have sought and 
obtained effective protection”17 were ineligible for the award 
of a permanent visa at any time. Given that onshore asy-
lum seekers commonly take long and perilous journeys to 
Australia, and normally spend time en route in non-signa-
tory countries such as Indonesia or Malaysia, this opened 
the prospect of “rolling” temporary protection periods for 
most onshore refugees.
The TPV was one aspect of a broad border protection 
strategy to “deter and deny” access of onshore asylum 
seekers to Australia’s protection obligations. In 2001, the 
Australian government introduced a range of other border 
protection strategies, in addition to the mandatory detention 
regime in place since 1992. These included the positioning 
of immigration officers at domestic and international air-
ports to detect people travelling on false documentation and 
strengthening the power of the Australian Navy to patrol 
the waters to Australia’s north. Other restrictive strategies 
included “Operation Relex,” which authorized the Navy 
to drag vessels approaching Australian waters back into 
Indonesian waters. They also included the collaboration of 
Australian and Indonesian intelligence to disrupt the activ-
ities of people smugglers in Indonesia.
The Pacific Solution was another strategy aimed at deter-
ring potential asylum seekers. The policy was introduced 
in October 2001 when the Migration Act was amended to 
excise a number of outlying islands from Australia’s migra-
tion zone. All asylum seekers who arrived by boat on these 
excised territories were held in detention centres on Nauru 
(and until 2005, Papua New Guinea), while their applica-
tions for asylum were processed. Such asylum seekers had 
no guarantee of being settled in Australia even if granted 
refugee status. Taylor18 reported that, without access to judi-
cial and administrative appeal procedures, refugee deter-
mination decisions on Nauru were more likely to be negative 
than those on the Australian mainland. These factors high-
lighted the increasingly limited avenues for seeking asylum 
in Australia between 1999 and 2007. A total of 10,800 TPVs 
were issued over this period.
In November 2007 a new Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
federal government was elected, ending eleven years of 
conservative Liberal-National party rule. In May 2008, 
the new ALP government announced that the TPV regime 
would be abolished and that future onshore asylum seek-
ers found to have Convention refugee status would receive 
Permanent Protection Visas (PPVs). Existing TPV holders 
would receive “Resolution of Status” (subclass 851) visas, 
with equivalent rights to permanent protection visa hold-
ers. Eligibility for this latter visa was signalled in order to 
prevent exisiting TPV holders from going through the 
status redetermination processes required for the granting 
of a PPV. Also abolished were the temporary humanitarian 
visas (THV) routinely granted to offshore “Pacific Solution” 
asylum seekers who were later accepted by Australia under 
the Special Humanitarian program. Existing THV holders 
would likewise receive a permanent “Resolution of Status” 
visa. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship over-
view of the changes noted the following rationale for the 
abolition of the TPV regime:19
TPVs and THVs were introduced by the previous government to 
discourage people smuggling activities resulting in unauthorised 
boat arrivals (UBAs) and to discourage refugees leaving their 
country of first asylum. The evidence clearly shows TPVs did not 
have any deterrent effect. In fact, there was an increase in the 
number of women and children making dangerous journeys to 
Australia.
The commitment to shut down the “Pacific Solution” 
camps in Nauru and PNG was also maintained, with the last 
asylum seekers from Nauru resettled in Australia in January 
2008. From this time, however, “offshore entry persons” 
have been processed on the distant Australian territory of 
Christmas Island. The Labor government has maintained the 
excision of Christmas Island and other territories from the 
migration zone, and as such, continues to process “offshore 
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entry persons” in a way that limits their access to the Refugee 
Review Tribunal or other forms of judicial review.
Denmark
Denmark was the first nation to become a signatory to the 
Refugee Convention in 1952. It has long been regarded as 
having a generous asylum policy, primarily due to the imple-
mentation of alternative forms of protection status, includ-
ing the so-called “de facto” status, under which asylum 
seekers who did not meet the strict criteria of the Refugee 
Convention could be granted protection if their situation 
warranted it. The de facto category included those avoiding 
military service, escaping situations of civil war, or subject 
to persecution for their gender or sexuality. Despite these 
generous policies, Denmark has not seen the mass influx of 
refugees experienced by other European countries.
A shift in public opinion over immigration in Denmark 
contributed to a change of government in November 2001. 
Legislative changes to immigration policy introduced in 
July 2002 sought to reduce the numbers of asylum seekers 
gaining entry to Denmark. These changes had three funda-
mental elements:20
Denmark’s commitment under international conventions must be 
honoured. The number of foreigners entering Denmark must be 
limited and stricter requirements must be introduced with regard 
to their obligation to support themselves. The refugees and immi-
grants already living in Denmark must be better integrated and 
get work more quickly.
A new asylum policy arose through a series of minor 
reforms, rather than one major legislative package. As 
Michael21 from the Danish Institute for Human Rights 
put it, “We have seen one new piece of legislation after the 
other.” From 2002, various changes were made to three 
key pieces of legislation: the Integration Act, the Aliens Act 
and the Nationality Act . Thoralf from the Danish Refugee 
Council notes, “We’ve seen changes to the Aliens Act on a 
steady half-year basis over the last few years. So you get a 
tightening up just a little bit every six months.”
Though outside the EU asylum framework, Denmark 
is signatory to the Dublin Convention, which results in 
refugees having to conceal their route to Denmark, as the 
interviewees point out. Katrin notes, “It will first be asked 
whether they should be assessed in another country. If they 
are not identified or if their travel route is unclear, then they 
can be detained. These are the main reasons for detaining 
people.”
Under the 2002 changes, the previous de facto status was 
abolished and replaced with “Status B” category. This new 
category continues to recognize the need for some forms of 
non-Convention protection under other sources of inter-
national law, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and offers protection against torture and the death 
penalty. However, unlike the previous de facto status, Status 
B does not encompass persons fleeing civil war or forced 
military service. Katrin from the Danish Refugee Council 
explains that this legislation has particularly affected asy-
lum seekers from Bosnia and Somalia, who would previously 
have been granted de facto status but are now ineligible.
One of the key changes in 2002 related to the dramatic 
increase in the length of the temporary protection visa 
period. Previously, refugees held a three-year temporary 
protection visa, and if found in need of further protec-
tion, were granted a permanent residency visa. In 2002, 
the newly elected government increased the length of the 
temporary visa to seven years, after which refugees could 
be granted a permanent residency and become eligible for 
Danish citizenship after nine years. The 2002 changes also 
introduced a series of limitations to family reunion rights. 
Family reunion was perceived by the Danish public to be 
a “backdoor route for spouses and their children to take 
advantage of Denmark’s generous social benefits.”22 Under 
the new regime, both spouses must be twenty-four years old 
or older, and a Danish citizen cannot sponsor a parent aged 
sixty years old or older. If a Danish citizen wants to sponsor 
a spouse, the couple must be able to prove that their “ties” 
are closer to Denmark than any other country. The Danish 
spouse must pay a deposit of 6,700 euros and have a place 
to live. If the marriage does not last seven years, the foreign 
spouse may be required to leave Denmark. Other changes 
made in the 2002 legislation circumscribed the ways asylum 
seekers can lodge applications for protection. Asylum seek-
ers can no longer lodge their applications at Danish embas-
sies, but must be present in Denmark to seek protection.
Following the introduction of the new changes, Denmark 
experienced a significant decrease in the numbers of asy-
lum seekers; in the same year, Norway experienced a large 
rise in asylum applications. This would circumstantially 
suggest that the temporary protection regime has impacted 
upon the numbers of people seeking asylum to Denmark. 
Approval rates for asylum applications also decreased fol-
lowing the introduction of the new laws. In 2005, the Danish 
Immigration Service (DIS) rejected approximately 90 per 
cent of asylum applications in the first instance, an increase 
from 50 per cent in 2002.23
Montgomery and Foldspang argue that recent refugee 
determination decisions also demonstrate a systemic bias 
against applications from Muslim asylum seekers.24 Their 
study concludes that families who practised a religion other 
than Islam were eight times more likely to receive a resi-
dency permit than Muslims. Also more likely to succeed 
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in gaining residency were families in which the father had 
higher levels of education and was employed in adminis-
trative work rather than manual labour. They argue that 
without greater transparency, the asylum decision process 
“seems to favour the selection of socially and culturally well 
situated refugees, while human rights violations seem to 
play a diminishing role.”25
In terms of welfare support, the payments available to 
temporary protection refugees in their first seven years 
stands at two-thirds of the amount received by other mem-
bers of the community, including refugees with permanent 
protection. While there is an additional payment for fam-
ilies with children, it is capped at two children, so that larger 
families receive no further benefit. The differential payment 
is ostensibly designed to encourage refugees into paid work. 
Despite this approach, only 20 per cent of refugees were in 
paid employment in 2003 after the instigation of the policy, 
compared with 25 per cent in 2002.26
The Danish policy of geographical dispersal of refugees is 
based on the “Scandinavian ethos of egalitarianism” whereby 
all regions in Denmark should equally share the “burden” of 
refugee settlement.27 While the basic concept of dispersal 
has support from the NGOs, an unnecessarily strict admin-
istration of the policy has negatively impacted on refugees 
experiences in their new country (Kristofer interviews). 
Many asylum seekers come to Denmark through social or 
familial networks, Kristofer explained, and the policy of 
dispersal does not recognize these networks. Refugees are 
thus often isolated from other contacts, even family mem-
bers, who live in other areas of Denmark. Similarly, Wren 
argues that dispersal is determined by housing availabil-
ity and demand, and commonly results in refugees being 
placed in areas of social deprivation, lacking adequate social 
opportunities, and settlement services.28
Germany
At the end of World War II, Germany introduced an asylum 
regime that was the most generous in the western world. 
Enshrined in the German constitution, or the Basic Law, the 
asylum policy ensured that all those who experienced perse-
cution could seek asylum in Germany. Article 16(2)2 states: 
“Persons persecuted for political reasons enjoy the right of 
asylum.” Schuster explains that the German Basic Law was 
a strong symbol of cleavage from the Nazi past, and con-
tained within it all the universal liberal norms and values 
that had been “repressed” by Nazi rule.29 She explains, “By 
enshrining these norms in the constitution, it was hoped 
that they would ensure the preservation of the liberal char-
acter of the new republic.”30 Thus, the Article in the Basic 
Law maintained Germany’s remarkable liberal rule on asy-
lum seekers and gave “unmatched protection”31 until 1993. 
No other aspect of the constitution came to cause as much 
controversy.32
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, increasing anti-
foreigner hostility and violence focused on refugees. In 
response, the government implemented measures in 1992 
to limit the ability of refugees to seek asylum in Germany. 
While clause 16(a)(1) remained unchanged, it was joined 
with a number of clauses significantly limiting the scope 
of the original policy. In particular, 16(a)(2) now states that 
the right to asylum
may not be invoked by a person who enters the federal terri-
tory from a member state of the European Communities or 
from another third state in which application of the [Refugee 
Convention] is assured … [in these cases] measures to termin-
ate an applicant’s stay may be implemented without regard to any 
legal challenge that may have been instituted against them.
This clause has become known as the “Third Country 
Rule,” which significantly altered the conditions under 
which people could seek asylum and limited the power of 
the courts to challenge its operation. Temporary protec-
tion legislation was introduced in January 2005. Under this 
policy, those assessed to be Convention refugees are granted 
a residence permit, valid for three years. After this time, the 
refugee’s case will be reassessed, and if the refugee is found 
to be in need of ongoing protection, a permanent residency 
visa is granted.
During the initial three-year period, a residence permit 
can be revoked at any time if the asylum seeker has commit-
ted a crime, has engaged in “hate-preaching,” or is found to 
have threatened German national security. Importantly, for 
Convention refugees, the permit can also be revoked if they 
are deemed to come from a country that is subsequently 
declared a “safe country of origin.” The notion of “safe coun-
try of origin” was developed in Europe in the early 1990s as 
part of the strategy of providing protection to Bosnian refu-
gees. Since 1992, Germany has had a list of “safe countries 
of origin” which is regularly reviewed and updated as part 
of its domestic law. To date, EU members have been unable 
to come to a consensus on safe countries to include a similar 
list in the Common European Asylum System.
As with Australia and Denmark, Germany’s temporary 
protection regime is part of a broader suite of measures that 
aim to decrease the number of asylum seekers entering its 
territory. As a party to the EU asylum regime, asylum seek-
ers to Germany are subject to three main EU agreements. 
The Schengen Agreement, which came into force in 1995, 
abolished checks at common borders of the signatory coun-
tries, meaning greater freedom of movement for EU citizens. 
For those from outside the Schengen area, the Agreement 
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means harmonized visa requirements, standardized checks 
at borders, and greater collaboration to combat crime. The 
resulting increased regulation of the borders of the EU has 
become known as “fortress Europe.” The Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999) incorporated the Schengen agreement into European 
Union law. It established the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining which Member State is responsible for con-
sidering an asylum application, and outlined minimum 
standards for all aspects of the asylum process, including 
minimum standards for temporary protection. Finally, the 
Dublin Regulation, or Dublin II (2003), aims to prevent asy-
lum seekers from submitting multiple applications for asy-
lum within the Schengen area. Under the Dublin Regulation, 
asylum seekers are processed in (and if necessary returned 
to) the country deemed responsible for  processing their 
application, usually the first European country through 
which the asylum seekers passed. The Dublin Regulation 
and Amsterdam Treaty, therefore, aim to limit so-called 
“asylum shopping.”
Since the mid-1980s, only 5 per cent of asylum seekers to 
Germany have been assessed to meet the requirements of the 
Refugee Convention.33 In 2002 and 2003, the grant rate for 
Germany was 3 per cent and 2 per cent respectively.34 Many 
rejected asylum seekers stay in Germany on Duldung, or 
“tolerated” status, for many years. Duldung is a “technical” 
rather than formal legal category, and is applied in cases 
where deportation has to be postponed for administrative or 
legal reasons. It is the weakest form of “protection” offered 
by the German state, and does not grant any particular 
right or duration of stay. Rather, if obstacles to deportation 
are found to remain, Duldung status is renewed every six 
months. As a result, “Geduldeten” may live in Germany for 
many years, in a phenomenon referred to as Kettenduldung, 
or “chain”-Duldung .
There are an estimated 200,000 people with Duldung 
status living in Germany, some of whom are estimated 
to have been residing on Duldung status for over sixteen 
years. Geduldeten have restricted access to employment and 
receive state benefits at a rate 20 percent below conventional 
social welfare payments. They cannot work for a year after 
the initial grant of Duldung status, and work permits stipu-
late the number of hours that they may work. Children can 
go to school, but cannot access vocational training. Finally, 
Geduldeten do not have rights to family reunion.35 As in 
Denmark, refugees and Geduldeten in Germany are allo-
cated to a town in which they may live and work. Once allo-
cated, refugees and Geduldeten are not permitted to travel 
further than thirty kilometres from the town, and it may 
be considered a breach of their residency permit if they do. 
There are legislative exceptions to this rule if the asylum 
seeker has found work in a different area.
In 2007, legislative changes were introduced designed 
to reduce the numbers of Geduldeten . The changes grant 
people with Duldung status who have lived in Germany 
for eight years, or six years if they have children, a tempor-
ary residency permit on 1 July 2007. At the end of 2009, 
these Geduldeten will be granted permanent residency if 
they have kept a clean criminal record; achieved independ-
ent financial security, regular employment, a high level of 
German language abilities, integration into German soci-
ety, and adequate accommodation according to the size 
of their family; and ensured regular school attendance for 
children. As part of the agreement, the amount of social 
assistance provided to Geduldeten is reduced. If these 
criteria are not met by the end of 2009, the consequence 
will be deportation.36 According to the Migration Policy 
Institute,37 this may apply to approximately 50,000 of the 
200,000 Geduldeten currently living in Germany.
Research Findings
Semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives 
working with refugees on TP were conducted in 2006 and 
2007. Three NGOs from Germany and four from Denmark 
took part in the study.38 These were compared with existing 
Australian data compiled by the authors over several previ-
ous studies.39
Five key themes emerged from the interviews. First, 
TP refugees in all three countries experienced social and 
financial difficulties occasioned by the TP policy. Second, 
the experience of temporary protection has led to a height-
ened sense of uncertainty in refugees’ lives. Third, the lack 
of rights to family reunion under temporary protection 
regimes has been a prime source of hardship for TP refu-
gees. Fourth, the interviewees were keenly aware of a new 
and restrictive political climate on refugee issues. Finally, 
NGOs experienced great challenges in meeting demands for 
their settlement support services and in maintaining their 
independence from government when advocating for refu-
gee rights.
Social and Financial Difficulties for Refugees
NGO respondents from all three countries were concerned 
about the everyday financial and social pressures imposed 
on refugees under TP regimes. In Germany, Jurgen from 
Flüchtlingsrat Berlin noted that both refugee policy and the 
broader economic climate made it difficult for asylum seek-
ers to live in Germany. Geduldeten may work after twelve 
months of being granted a residence permit, but only if they 
can secure a job that no other German unemployed person 
can perform. The result of this policy, according to Jurgen, 
is that 99 per cent of people with Duldung status are unem-
ployed and dependent on social aid.
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In Germany, Convention refugees have entitlement to the 
full rate of public assistance. Asylum seekers and Geduldeten, 
however, receive 80 per cent of the public assistance paid to 
unemployed German nationals, or less if they are part of the 
group given temporary residency visas in July 2007. In prin-
ciple, this assistance is not given in cash, but in kind, such as 
the provision of medical treatment. Jurgen explains:
This social aid from the state is lower than the social aid for 
Germans. They get only 225 Euro a month, if they get it in cash. 
Germans get 345 Euro plus housing and medical care. But the law 
says that asylum seekers should get food and clothes vouchers, not 
cash. So in many cases they only get pocket money of 40 Euro per 
month for an adult, for using public transport. Do you know how 
much public transport is? 4 Euro for a return ticket. So 36 is left for 
the month. And then you need to pay the phone …
Both Germany and Denmark have settlement policies 
requiring geographic dispersal, with the aim of shifting 
migrants away from the metropolitan centres where they 
might form ethnic “ghettos.” Germany’s dispersal policy 
restricts the movement of refugees and Duldung to an area 
of thirty kilometres around their homes. Refugees and 
Duldung are fined, and refugees may face problems with 
gaining permanency, if they breach this restriction. Jurgen 
argues that these policies limit the ability of refugees to inte-
grate, by limiting employment and educational options, and 
also limit the ability for refugees to visit friends and family 
in other areas of Germany. In Denmark, Kristofer from the 
Danish Institute of Human Rights agrees with the general 
idea of geographic dispersal, but argues that it is too strictly 
administered:
I think it’s working to some extent … I’m not against it per se, 
otherwise everybody gets stuck in Copenhagen … But it has 
become extremely rigid, far too rigid, in that you are stuck in 
those places and families cannot get together.
Some interviewees saw positive effects, as some rural 
centres were benefiting from the increase in population and 
a revitalized community. As Karita from the Danish Red 
Cross notes:
What happened over here in the remote northern part of Jutland, 
they found out that the asylum seekers who went to those centres 
went to shops and spent money there, and a few of the citizens 
could go and work at the asylum centres. When the immigration 
service came and said they were going to close down these centres 
because it is a stupid place to have asylum seekers, the whole vil-
lage said “please no, don’t close our centre, these are our asylum 
seekers.”
A similar phenomenon of “regional renewal” occurred 
with TPV holders in rural Australia, with high profile rural 
community campaigns leading to the 2004 changes in the 
Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme, which allowed TPV 
holders in rural areas to gain permanent work visas and fill 
lower-skilled job vacancies, without first leaving the country 
and re-entering under a new “offshore” visa.
Interviewees also highlighted the lack of integration 
opportunities for TP refugees. In Denmark, children with 
temporary protection have the same access to education as 
Danish citizens, but for the first few years many of them 
attend school at the reception centres where they are accom-
modated, where they can only interact with other refugee 
children. Emilia and Henderson from the Research and 
Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims observe that this 
policy is in itself a barrier to integration. As Emilia argues, 
“You build up a system that prevents integration, and then 
you say people have to be integrated.” Henderson continues, 
“Then you turn it around and say, well, there is something 
inherently wrong with you, you cannot integrate. You have 
a problem, it is within you.”
Uncertainty in Refugees’ Lives
NGO respondents in Australia, Denmark, and Germany 
each highlighted the impact temporary protection was hav-
ing on the psychological well-being of refugees. Extended 
periods of temporary protection under the new regulations, 
Henderson says, are “creating a 7 year existential mora-
torium.” Similarly, Emilia mentions cases of “complicated 
traumatic stress.” In Denmark, in addition to temporary 
protection refugees, there is another group of refugees liv-
ing in great uncertainty, the so-called “phase 3 rejected asy-
lum seekers.” This group are in a parallel situation to the 
Geduldeten in Germany—they are designated for removal 
from the country, but their immediate deportation is not 
possible for legal or technical reasons. As noted above, 
many asylum seekers from Somalia not granted protection 
under the new status B law are in this category. These phase 
3 rejected asylum seekers are accommodated in the two 
“departure centres” at Sandholm and Avnstrup. As Katrin 
from the Danish Refugee Council notes:
They can’t get formal protection now, but still they can’t be sent 
back. So they are sitting in the Avnstrup and Sandholm camps 
waiting. They cannot be sent out by force, because the police even 
do not dare to go there themselves, they do not dare escort them 
back to Somalia.
Regulations introduced in Germany in 2005 allow the 
government to revoke the refugee status of refugees who 
have been in Germany for less than three years, if the 
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situation in the country of origin is found to have changed. 
Where most countries consider past persecution sufficient 
reason for granting ongoing refugee status, TP jurisdictions 
commonly hold that the granting of a refugee visa may not 
be the “last word” on one’s status. Since 2005, 18,000 Iraqis 
who had initially been granted refugee status in Germany 
have had their refugee status revoked on the basis of changed 
political conditions in Iraq.40 As Johanson, from Germany’s 
Centre for Treatment of Torture Victims, explains,
They are saying people got political asylum because Saddam 
Hussein was in power and persecuting them. So he is no longer in 
power so there is no longer any danger of being persecuted, but in 
fact there is still a danger of being a victim of the war situation. For 
these two different situations you now get different statuses.
According to Johnson, many Iraqi refugees are still 
“afraid” that they may be eventually returned to Iraq. Those 
who have had their refugee status revoked but still hold a 
residency permit may stay in Germany until it expires, after 
which they are deported or granted Duldung status. The 
policy introduced in 2005 to grant permanency to some 
Geduldeten exacerbates the sense of uncertainty for people 
with tolerated status. Rather than issue an amnesty to all 
Geduldeten, the 2005 policy allowed each state to set up a 
commission to assess the humanitarian status of individ-
ual Geduldeten . These state commissions, made up of rep-
resentatives from NGOs, would recommend to the Federal 
Minister of the Interior that an individual should be given 
permanent protection. Although this has benefited some 
individuals, Jurgen explains that he “has a problem with 
the justice, it is somehow extralegal. I would prefer if you 
allowed this for everybody who has been here for 5 years, it 
is more just.”
One problem with this policy is that each federal state 
uses this policy differently. Berlin has put forward about 
1,300 people for permanent status, of whom 650 have been 
successful. Other states have been less proactive about 
endorsing asylum seekers to the Minister of the Interior. The 
federal state of Bavaria has not set up a commission, and no 
individuals have been recommended to the Minister of the 
Interior. Johanson from the Centre for Treatment of Torture 
Victims in Berlin argues that granting amnesty to the large 
numbers of Geduldeten in Germany is “the task of the day,” 
and that by setting up commissions to grant permanency to 
individuals the government has missed the opportunity to 
make a difference on a large scale. Jurgen agrees, arguing 
that this policy has served to keep the level of discussion 
about Duldung “low.” He explains:
It gives a solution to give to cases in the newspaper, they wanted to 
use this to keep the discussion low. It is used for political reasons, 
to give something to the Churches. So each Church’s most-loved 
refugee can get status, which is what I don’t like. It discriminates 
against others.
Right to Family Reunion
In all three jurisdictions, the restriction of rights to family 
reunion had the greatest impact on refugee lives. In 
Australia, refugees on TPVs had no right to family reunion. 
For those TPV refugees who had breached the “seven-day 
rule” by spending more than week in a third country en 
route to Australia, and were therefore threatened with “roll-
ing” TPVs from 2001, it seemed likely that they might never 
be entitled to bring their families to Australia. Equally, for 
Australian TPV holders, leaving the country to visit rela-
tives meant relinquishing their protection status and their 
right to re-enter the country.
Leach and Mansouri documented the feelings of guilt and 
despair among male TPV holders resident in Australia who 
were unable to bring their immediate families to Australia.41 
This policy had another impact, in that more women and 
children began to make the dangerous boat journey to 
Australia themselves. After 2001, an unprecedented number 
of women and children arrived by boat as exemplified by 
the disaster of the Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel (SIEV) x, 
which sank in August 2001, killing 353 of its 393 passengers. 
The majority of those who died were women and children, 
many of whom were travelling to Australia, where their hus-
bands and sons were already resident on TPVs.
Restrictions on family reunification for refugees with 
temporary protection form another barrier to integration. 
In Germany, refugees have rights to family reunification. If 
their refugee visa is revoked, however, the person may stay 
in the country for the rest of his or her residence permit, 
but loses rights to family reunion. Geduldeten do not have 
rights to family reunion. Moreover, the policy of dispersal 
does not take into account the location of other relatives liv-
ing in Germany, and many refugees are placed in regions a 
long way from family, and risk jeopardizing the grant of a 
permanent visa if they visit them.
With the change to asylum policy in Denmark in 2002, 
rights to family reunion were tightened. Refugees on tem-
porary protection have no right to reunion with a spouse, 
unless the spouse proves strong ties to Denmark (the same 
applies to non-Danish migrants married to Danes) or are 
themselves assessed as refugees requiring protection from 
Denmark. A DK50,000 (US$10,000) bond is required for 
the reunion of spouses, and the Danish spouse must not 
have received social assistance for the period leading up 
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to the reunion. Equally, the spouse coming to Denmark 
must be capable of working. No spousal reunion is granted 
for a spouse less than twenty-four years of age, nor family 
reunion for parents if the parent is over sixty years of age.42 
These policies restricting family reunion are, according to 
Kristofer, “contrary to basic human rights principles,” and 
operate to limit the ability for refugees to integrate.
Exclusionist Political Climate
Most interviewees noted the impacts on refugees of a wider 
shift in the public discourses on immigration. Kristofer 
mentions the Danish government’s overt unwillingness to 
commit to international standards of human rights. Similar 
themes were notable across the three jurisdictions.
Previous social democratic governments said we will respect our 
international obligations. The new party now says, well, what are 
our international obligations? Do we have a case for saying we will 
not do this? … We want to decide how policies should be made, we 
are not going to ratify a new legal instrument …. So I am hearing 
more and more of this rhetoric about human rights being “anti-
democratic,” and it is always focused on foreigners.
Denmark’s transformation from one of the most pro-
gressive asylum states in Europe to a “hardliner”on refu-
gee issues had certainly resulted in decreasing numbers of 
asylum seekers. Katrin describes this as the impact of “the 
rumour about Denmark”:
The rumour about Denmark and the fact that it is well known that 
it is difficult to get family reunion in Denmark, certainly that has 
had an impact … and changed things in rather a short period. 
Denmark used to be known for its human rights, and now it is 
completely different.
Kristofer notes that “the 2002 legislation had a tremen-
dous signal effect. This signal was picked up around the 
world so the number of asylum seekers dropped.” In spite 
of this, Kristofer sees a positive side to the development—a 
consciousness-raising effect on the wider public, as repres-
sive regulations have in turn “created a tremendous human 
rights awareness.” Accordingly, representatives of the 
Danish Refugee Council stressed the important role of more 
than 2,000 volunteers who are the mainstay of settlement 
and integration programs, helping children with home-
work, running language schools, and organizing leisure and 
community-building activities.
A common theme in the German interviews was the 
observation of increased difficulties for asylum seekers to gain 
protection in Germany. These difficulties include physical 
obstacles, such as increased policing in Eastern European 
states. Jurgen noted that Poland and other Eastern European 
countries are more likely now to deport and imprison asy-
lum seekers. He states, “Eastern Europe in the beginning 
of the 1990s used to be the main refugee route, and now it 
is really dangerous for [asylum seekers] to come this way.” 
Similarly, the introduction of the Schengen agreement, and 
policies like the third country rule, makes seeking protection 
in Europe more difficult. At the same time, there has been sig-
nificant narrowing of the refugee definition, so that the rate 
of those granted refugee status is only 2 to 3 per cent. Many 
asylum seekers who would have once received refugee status 
no longer fit the criteria, and some of these remain in the 
country under Duldung status. As Jurgen puts it, “nowhere 
in the world is there such a low recognition rate.”
The increased difficulty in gaining access to Germany 
is the aim of European Union border protection policy. 
Johanson observes that much of the EU approach to asy-
lum seekers has been modelled on German policies. In some 
cases this relationship has been the reverse; for example, the 
policy of revocation of protection visas was originally an 
EU policy that was immediately adopted by Germany. Yet 
Johanson also acknowledges that one aspect of EU policy 
has improved the situation for asylum seekers. In addition 
to the Refugee Convention definition of refugee status, the 
EU now recognizes persecution against women, and perse-
cution by groups other than the government of the coun-
try of origin, as criteria for granting refugee status. This has 
improved the chances of some asylum seekers in gaining 
protection in Europe.
Diminishing Resources for NGOs
Like their counterparts in Australia and Germany, NGOs 
across Denmark feel their advocacy and settlement support 
work has been increasingly impeded. Kristofer, as the head of 
the Danish Institute for Human Rights, reported experien-
cing personal attacks from the Danish People’s Party (DPP), 
one of a coalition of parties in government since 2001:
For two months if you entered into the webpage for the DPP … 
you would find a picture of me. When you “clicked” on me you 
find a list of all the nasty things I have done in my life. So they 
effectively put pressure on the new government to close us down. 
The decision was made, but then, thanks to a lot of support inter-
nationally as well as domestically, they figured that that was not 
such a good idea. But the threat of closure was a very symbolic 
gesture from the government that demonstrated the nature of the 
new times.
Kristofer went on to note the growing challenges facing refu-
gee advocates in general, including financial constraints:
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Our organisation may be a particular target, but it is more general 
than that … we have never had such a difficult time in relation to 
freedom of expression. This is contrary to what the Prime Minister 
has claimed about freedom of choice … we have never had such 
a difficult time, where critical voices are constantly harassed, or 
suffering funding cuts, and so on.
For its part, the Danish Refugee Council has had its influ-
ence in asylum determination processes severely curtailed 
under legislative changes made in 2002. The Council previ-
ously had two of the five chairs on the Refugee Board, which 
makes decisions on individual applications for asylum. In 
2002, the Refugee Board was reduced from five to three 
members, cutting out the Refugee Council places in the 
process. While the Council still retains a veto right in the 
so-called “manifestly unfounded” procedure, it is no longer 
represented on the more important body with the final say 
in asylum decisions.
Financial restraints on NGOs have affected their ability 
to advocate on behalf of refugees. The Rehabilitation and 
Research Centre for Torture Victims now works on a “paid 
per session” funding arrangement, for both rehabilitation 
services and research projects. This has had a significant 
impact on the scope of the services provided. In particu-
lar, it means staff time is spent providing direct individual 
client services, with a diminished ability to conduct “sector 
advocacy” on behalf of their clients as a whole. This arrange-
ment brought on by recent conditions attached to govern-
ment funding affects 95 per cent of the Centre’s budget. As 
such, only 5 per cent of its budget is allocated towards sector 
advocacy to deal with wider policy issues.
Interviewees in Germany also experienced difficulties 
in providing services to refugees as a result of funding and 
resource cuts. Johanson notes that his organization, the 
Centre for Treatment of Torture Victims, is one of only four 
that receive funding from sources other than the German 
government. He explains that the “increased reliance on our 
services” means that “we have to work very hard to meet 
demand.”
We have very long waiting list, but we can’t deliver the services 
that are needed by the people. We have lists on which people are 
waiting for 1 or 2 years. There is so much work needed apart from 
the psychotherapy, such as writing the psychological certificates 
and supporting them in their court cases as psychologists.
Two of the German NGOs also noted difficulties in main-
taining independence from the government, which they 
regarded as essential to effective refugees advocacy. While 
Flüchtlingsrat Berlin receives 50 per cent of its funding 
from the European Commission, this money is channelled 
through the Federal Office for Migration in Germany, com-
promising the ability of the organization to maintain an 
independent stance. Jurgen explains:
The Office for Migration visits us once a year and asks us if we are 
working well. Sometimes I feel that maybe if we are more critical 
of them they may not fund us … if I’m honest it is a problem to try 
to be 100% independent.
Similarly, Estella from xenion, an organization that pro-
vides psychosocial help to refugees, stressed the importance 
of maintaining financial independence from other organiz-
ations. This is, according to Estella, “so we can say whatever 
we want without having to worry that the funding organisa-
tion will say ‘no, we don’t want that.’”
Conclusion
The case studies reported in this paper illustrate some 
poignant aspects of the impact of temporary protec-
tion regimes in three western jurisdictions. In Australia, 
Denmark, and Germany, recent trends in refugee policy 
have two contradictory elements. On the one hand, gov-
ernments have introduced strategies to reduce the num-
bers of refugees entering the country. On the other, each 
has placed increased emphasis on the socio-economic and 
cultural integration of refugees into the community. This 
paper’s findings strongly suggest that, rather than facili-
tating this integration, temporary protection regimes have 
actively hindered integration in a number of key ways. 
Reduced access to education, health care, language tuition, 
and employment services all serve to limit functional 
economic and social settlement of refugees and radically 
reduce the refugees’ ability to function fully and compe-
tently in their new communities. Equally, the emotional 
distress caused by the separation of families and the lack 
of certainty about the future further disables refugees’ 
capacity to integrate. In particular, the ever present and 
implicit threat of forced repatriation means that TP regimes 
are inherently incapable of fostering psychological and 
cultural settlement and, more critically, are prone to polit-
ical and public “controversy.”43 In all three jurisdictions—
until the abolition of the TPV in Australia in 200844—the 
transition between temporary protection and permanent 
protection was not automatic. The refugee must meet cer-
tain criteria, including passing language tests and criminal 
record checks. Most importantly, the refugee must dem-
onstrate a need for ongoing protection at the expiry of the 
period of TP. To do so, they must not come from a country 
subsequently declared a “safe country of origin.” In terms 
of settlement support services, the research shows that 
that NGOs supporting refugees have found it increasingly 
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difficult to meet demands on their services, as the state 
has reduced rights of access to employment, provision of 
settlement services, and restricted access to mainstream 
welfare benefits.
Australian research comparing the mental health of 
refugees with temporary and permanent protection visas45 
shows that temporary protection can impact dramatically 
on refugees’ mental health, and that the TPV status was 
the greatest single contributor to post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). TPV holders’ experiences in detention 
contributed to this, but current living conditions, fears of 
returning home, worry about the family’s safety, and lack 
of family reunion were also major contributors to mental 
health decline. One Australian study indicated that TPV 
refugees had a 700 per cent increased risk of developing 
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder in compari-
son with PPV refugees; and that these extended periods of 
temporary protection operated to “lock individuals into an 
unresolvable future-oriented” stress, undermining stan-
dard treatments and therapies for trauma premised on a 
“core assumption of safety as a necessary precondition.”46 
The long-term effects of an extended exclusion from settle-
ment services, in conjunction with the impacts of initial 
periods of mandatory detention, remain to be seen. These 
effects are likely to remain critical factors in the ongoing 
settlement experience of former TPV holders. Similarly, 
in Germany, Bosnian temporary protection holders were 
found to have experienced a “permanent state of anxiety” 
as a result of their temporary status.47 This emotional dis-
tress can impact on the whole refugee experience, affect-
ing refugees’ ability to learn the host country language, to 
work, and to raise children in a healthy environment.
Temporary protection is one of many mechanisms for 
limiting refugees’ access to protection, which also include 
extraterritorial processing and offshoring arrangements. 
These “substitute protection” mechanisms limit access to 
effective protection under the Convention. In the three 
countries discussed in this study, the temporary protection 
policies have obstructed successful integration. Policies 
that place limits on learning the language, that limit access 
to education or health care, and that restrict movement 
radically reduce the refugees’ ability to function normally 
in their new communities. The emotional distress caused 
by the separation of families and the lack of certainty about 
the future further disables refugees’ ability to integrate. In 
each case, TP policies undermine the stated goals of pro-
moting greater integration and assimilation into the host 
country.
The internationalization of western refugee policy 
development is evident in the extent to which countries 
are able and willing to import harsher policies perceived to 
have been successful elsewhere. As Danish Refugee Council 
spokesperson Thoralf puts it, there is “no doubt” that the 
extraterritorialization phase of recent developments in asy-
lum policy in Europe had been inspired by Australia’s “Pacific 
Solution” arrangements. It seems likely that the “substitute 
protection” TP mechanisms introduced in Denmark and 
Germany were similarly influenced by the introduction of 
the Australian TPV in 1999. In this context, the dramatic 
decision of a new Australian government to abolish the 
TPV regime in 2008 is an important one, which is likely to 
be noticed internationally. This reform signalled the cap-
acity of concerted domestic and international campaigns to 
reverse restrictive trends in Western asylum policy, held by 
many commentators to be “inevitable” in an age in which 
refugee issues are increasingly viewed through the prisms of 
national security and sovereignty.
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